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INVITED ARTICLE
Reflections on 30 years of Cognition & Emotion
Robert W. Levenson
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
The publication of the first issue of Cognition & Emotion in 1987 helped open the
floodgates to what has become a golden age of emotion research in the social and
biological sciences. In this article, I describe the intellectual landscape of that era
and trace key developments that helped foster the growth of the field of affective
science. Looking back from a present-day perspective, I offer some thoughts on the
major changes that have occurred over the past three decades, the opportunities
and challenges that lie ahead, and my own personal journey toward becoming an
affective scientist (which largely occurred during this period). Finally, I offer three
considerations that might be helpful for young researchers who are already in the
field of affective science or are considering entering it.
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The publication of the first issue of Cognition &
Emotion in 1987 was a bellwether event in the
history of affective science, setting the stage for
three remarkable decades of growth and discovery.
In the contemporary environment, research on
emotion is so pervasive and so richly connected to
other areas of science that it’s almost impossible to
imagine that this was not always the case. However,
it most definitely was not. A time traveller going
back to 1987 would encounter a strikingly different
landscape, one in which there were no emotion jour-
nals, no emotion textbooks, little mention of emotion
per se in many of the introductory psychology text-
books, no emotion research societies, and relatively
few scientists who identified themselves as emotion
researchers. On a more personal level, my own
journey to becoming an emotion researcher played
out during this same period; thus, I will include some
of my own experiences when appropriate.
Origin stories
Although the “cognitive revolution” was already well
established in psychology in the 1970s, neither
emotion nor the relationship between cognition and
emotion were major foci. As a graduate student in
psychology during that decade, I am hard pressed to
recall any major consideration of emotion in my
coursework. The one exception was in my applied
clinical psychology training, where blocked/repressed
emotions were viewed as causes of certain trouble-
some symptoms in psychiatric and psychosomatic
illnesses and served as targets of several therapeutic
interventions (e.g. the cathartic release of repressed
emotions in psychodynamic psychotherapy).
The 1970s also saw a great deal of research on
stress, which was viewed in a fairly global and
undifferentiated way (Rahe & Arthur, 1978) and was
not yet concerned with specific emotions. Emotion
did take centre stage in one area of research, which
was concerned with the “universality” of facial
expressions of emotion. Although Darwin (1872) had
written quite extensively about similarities in
emotional expression across species a century
earlier, the dominant viewpoint in the social sciences
was more in line with cultural relativism (e.g. Mead,
1935). Thus, the pioneering studies demonstrating
cross-cultural consistency in the recognition and pro-
duction of emotional facial expressions (Ekman &
Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971) opened the door for
research that considered the role of particular
emotions. Several other developments in this period
were important for the subsequent growth of
emotion research. A slim volume entitled “Emotion
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in the Human Face” (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972)
provided a comprehensive review of research on facial
expression since Darwin. In addition, the Facial Action
Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) was
published, providing an objective anatomically-
based tool for precisely describing the activity of the
muscular actions responsible for facial expressions.
During this period, I was an erstwhile stress
researcher who was using film stimuli to study
disease-related autonomic nervous system (ANS)
changes in individuals with asthma (Levenson, 1979).
Taking advantage of the newly available video record-
ing technology I vividly remember being struck by the
diversity of behavioural responses displayed by par-
ticipants in our experiments in response to our film
stimuli. Shoe-horning all of this expressive heterogen-
eity into a single-term (“stress response”) seemed mis-
guided. I devoured a copy of Emotion in the Human
Face and in 1981 was headed to San Francisco to
spend my first sabbatical in the laboratory of Paul
Ekman and Wallace Friesen. My intent was to learn
FACS and hopefully to become a competent
emotion researcher.
Cognition and emotion
Research on the relationship between cognition and
emotion came into prominence in the 1980s. And, as
is often the case, it benefitted from a riveting contro-
versy carried out between highly articulate and charis-
matic proponents of two very different positions. On
the one hand, Richard Lazarus (e.g. Lazarus, 1982)
envisioned cognitive activity as a necessary precondi-
tion for emotion. More specifically, he argued that for
an emotion to occur in a given situation there must be
some appraisal of that situation as having conse-
quences for the individual’s well-being. In contrast,
Robert Zajonc (e.g. Zajonc, 1980) envisioned affect
and cognition as separable and partially independent
systems. More specifically, he argued that affect could
sometimes be generated without prior cognitive pro-
cessing and could at times precede cognition. A few
years before the first issue of Cognition & Emotion
appeared, the two gladiators restated their positions
in bookend articles entitled “On the Primacy of Cogni-
tion” (Lazarus, 1984) and “On the Primacy of Affect”
(Zajonc, 1984) that were widely read and discussed.
As almost always is the case with “either/or” contro-
versies, the final resolution included a healthy helping
of “both”. Predictably, in this particular debate, defini-
tional issues as to what constitutes “cognition” and
what constitutes “emotion” ended up being critically
important. I will not try to re-litigate the relative
merits of the two positions, but will note that the
debate served to stimulate a great deal of interest in
this research area and undoubtedly attracted a
number of young scientists to research on emotion
in general and on the relationship between cognition
and emotion in particular.
Thirty years of research on cognition and
emotion: what has changed?
Thirty years is approximately the lifespan of an aca-
demic generation. It is a sad reality that the galvanis-
ing, seemingly unforgettable debates of our youth
are often treated somewhat badly by history and its
cruel dustbin. What is clear about these particular 30
years is that emotion research has gone from a pos-
ition of relative obscurity to one of seeming ubiquity.
A personal example may be illustrative. In 1987, I was
part of a small group of emotion researchers who
began planning what would become a prominent
long-lived NIMH-funded training programme in
Affective Science (the programme has continued in
various forms from 1989 through the present). Our
plan was to train a new generation of emotion
researchers who would be conversant with biological
and behavioural approaches, human and non-human
animal models, and basic and applied research. To
staff the programme we struggled to find a dozen
faculty in the US and abroad who had active
emotion research programmes that were appropriate
for this kind of training. Three decades later it would
be quite feasible to have a single-campus version of
this kind of programme at many universities and
medical centres.
Many things have contributed to the dramatic
increase in emotion research, but here I will mention
a few that seem particularly important.
Refinement of appraisal theory
One of the keystones of modern affective science has
been the elaboration of appraisal theory. Early stress
research often found connections between life stress
and more distal outcomes (health) but did not elabor-
ate on or explore the mediating pathways. This argu-
ably began to change with Arnold’s appraisal theory
(e.g. Arnold, 1960) and Lazarus’ distinction between
primary (i.e. significance) and secondary (i.e. ability
to cope) appraisals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
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Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970). Importantly, modern
appraisal theories (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Roseman, Anto-
niou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer, 1988, 2001; Smith & Ells-
worth, 1985) link particular appraisals and appraisal
sequences with the elicitation of particular emotions
(or emotion dimensions). Because the predictions
are well-specified, these modern elaborations of
appraisal theory can be tested using both correlational
and experimental designs. An additional level of
specificity is found in recent theoretical and empirical
work that combines ideas about the elements in the
appraisal sequence with the appearance of particular
facial actions (e.g. Scherer, Mortillaro, & Mehu, 2013).
Moreover, because the temporal characteristics of
these appraisal sequences are well-specified, future
research may be able to leverage improvements in
the spatial and temporal resolution of physiological
measures (e.g. magnetoencephalography, intracranial
electroencephalography) to provide additional empiri-
cal tests of these appraisal models.
Emphasis on the influences of emotion on
cognition
Most theories in affective science envision cognitive
processing (e.g. appraisal) as preceding the occur-
rence of emotion. However, important exceptions to
this rubric are found in peripheralist views that allow
for the possibility that emotions can arise from
“pure” sensory processing, interoception of ANS
activity, or proprioception of somatic activity (e.g.
James, 1884; Levenson, 1999; Zajonc, 1984). Regard-
less of the role that cognitive processes play in produ-
cing emotion, there can be little doubt that once an
emotion occurs it can have profound influences on
our thoughts, our judgments, and the ways we com-
municate these thoughts and judgments to others
(Bolte, Goschke, & Kuhl, 2003; Isen, 1990; Reber,
Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004).
There are several prominent areas of contemporary
research where emotions may critically influence cog-
nitive processes, including the role that: (a) fear plays
in the loss aversion that underlies a number of
irrational biases in decision-making (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1974); (b) fear and anxiety play in the altered self-
appraisals and performance that accompany stereo-
type threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995); and (c) emotions
such as anger, fear, and disgust play in shaping
implicit cognitions (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz,
1998) and implicit prejudices (Glaser & Knowles,
2008; Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens,
2007). In each of these areas, emotions were not a
primary focus of the original theories and research
but rather represent potentially fruitful avenues for
future inquiry.
Importance of emotion in psychopathology
and psychotherapy
Disruptions in emotional functioning occur in a large
number of psychiatric disorders (Keltner & Kring,
1998) whether diagnosed using traditional syndromic
approaches (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)
or newer symptom-based approaches (Insel et al.,
2010). Historically research in psychopathology and
psychotherapy has been the province of clinical psy-
chologists and psychiatrists who had limited training
in affective science. Affective science has the potential
to revolutionise clinical research and practice, introdu-
cing powerful tools for measuring changes in
emotional functioning that have not traditionally
been used in clinical research or practice. These
tools hold great promise for improving diagnosis, pre-
cisely monitoring changes in symptomatology, evalu-
ating the effectiveness of psychological and
pharmacological treatments, and uncovering mechan-
isms of psychopathology that can become the targets
for new interventions. Changes in grant funding pol-
icies at the National Institute of Mental Health that
emphasize mission-critical and translational research
have inspired many basic affective scientists to
begin to investigate mental health related issues.
With the huge societal burden of mental illness world-
wide and the slow rate of progress in reducing that
burden (Levenson, 2017), I expect that clinical
affective science will continue to grow in importance.
New opportunities in neuroscience and
computational approaches
Neuroimaging has opened up new opportunities for
affective scientists to explore the neural correlates of
emotional functioning (Lindquist, Wager, Kober,
Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Phan, Wager, Taylor, &
Liberzon, 2002; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor,
2003). As with any new technology, there are the
inevitable false starts and growing pains. Moreover,
the physical constraints and unusual environmental
characteristics associated with neuroimaging method-
ology (e.g. loud repetitive noises, recumbent posture,
problems with movement artifacts) create significant
challenges for studying emotional states.
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Studies using neurological patients provide
another important methodology for examining
brain–behavior relationships. Although historically
this approach has often been used with single-
subject case studies or very small samples (e.g.
Harlow, 1848), we have recently been conducting
studies of emotional functioning using relatively
large samples of neurological patients with well-
characterized areas of neural loss (Levenson, Sturm,
& Haase, 2014; Sturm & Levenson, in press). Studies
with neurological patients can provide invaluable
data concerning brain–behavior relationships
without the kinds of methodological constraints
associated with neuroimaging studies.
Measures of emotion, especially when obtained
repeatedly over time in multiple modalities (e.g. sub-
jective experience, facial expression, ANS) across
many individuals provide ideal data sets for machine
learning and other large-data computational
approaches. Because of the commercial value of
being able to monitor emotional states remotely
there are many companies in the private sector that
are already working in this area. Both in collaboration
with these companies and in traditional university-
based research, there will be numerous opportunities
for affective scientists to participate in this emerging
area in the coming years.
Challenges and advice for young researchers
Although I am not a great fan of advice-giving, in
keeping with the charge given contributors to this
special section, here are three things to consider.
Decide whether you want to study emotion or
emotion-related processes
Emotion research can be immensely rewarding and
interesting, but it is difficult to do well. Many labora-
tory procedures and measures work best when par-
ticipants are calm, cool, collected, and still; many
emotions make participants aroused, hot, discombo-
bulated, and animated--definitely not a good match.
One common solution to the problem of wanting to
study emotion but not wanting subjects to be
overly emotional is to have subjects reflect on,
judge, opine about, or imagine their own emotions
or those of others. These “emotion once removed”
approaches arguably make the researcher’s life
much easier and create fewer concerns for human
subjects’ committees. However, it is important not
to assume that a person thinking about how often
she is angry or observing anger in another person
is a reasonable proxy for a person who is in the
throes of intense anger resulting from having
been cheated out of something that is theirs or fru-
strated in an interaction with a difficult person.
Absent strong evidence to the contrary, the
default assumption should be that results do not
generalise across this methodological divide. If you
are really interested in emotion per se; it is best
to face the challenges and find a way to study
actual emotion responding.
Avoid turf (and associated wars)
Perhaps it’s the subject matter or perhaps it’s the kinds
of people who get drawn to the subject matter, but
too often in the last 30 years of emotion research
there has been a scientific style in which: (a) prior pos-
itions based on opinions and/or on past research were
hardened and defended rather than tested and chal-
lenged with data from new, critical experiments; (b)
ad hominem characterisations of other camps increas-
ingly became a standard part of the discourse; and (c)
multi-generational “camps” were formed in which dis-
ciples were more committed to proving the veracity of
their founder’s theoretical position than pursuing a
more progressive scientific strategy of rejecting
alternative hypotheses and discovering boundary
conditions that delimit the areas where theories are
and are not supported. In addition to the attendant
lack of civility and collegiality, defending turf in
these ways can effectively halt scientific progress.
Embrace the interpersonal
It’s generally accepted that emotion is inherently
interpersonal. We recognise emotions in other
people; regulate our own emotions because of
their effects on others; and rely on emotions to
communicate our needs, intentions, desires, and
likely behaviours to others. With this in mind, does
it really make sense to build a research programme
on emotion that is solely intrapersonal? Thirty-five
years ago when we (Levenson & Gottman, 1983)
did our first studies of emotion during social inter-
action they were very unusual, difficult to publish,
and filled with data analytic “gotcha’s”. The situation
is now much improved and should only get better. I
think a serious research programme aimed at
almost any imaginable aspect of emotion would
benefit greatly from having a strong interpersonal
component.
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Concluding thoughts
The past 30 years have witnessed meteoric growth in
affective science. We all owe a huge debt to the foun-
ders of Cognition & Emotion for their vision in seeing
the need for a new journal in what was to become
such an important and vibrant area for theory and
research. New methodologies, a spate of new and
enduring research questions, and the increasing rel-
evance for other areas of research all augur well for
the future of this journal and the important research
area it has chronicled so ably.
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